The
following posting is by a guest reviewer, my husband, Ron Kronish. We both had the opportunity to view The
Human Factor (documentary, 75 minutes, 2019), directed by Dror Moreh
(known for his important documentary, The Gatekeepers, 2012).
As part of
the online Jerusalem Film Festival this week, I viewed the depressing and also insightful
film on the history of the failures of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of
the last 29 years, from the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 until the phony
“deal of the century” of the current American administration. It is a very sad history of many missed
opportunities, and manifold major misunderstandings, which have left us in
Israel and Palestine with virtually no solution in sight, almost 30 years
later.
With
fabulous archival photos and footage of all the main players in the attempts to
create a comprehensive peace agreement between the Israelis and the
Palestinians during the past three decades, Dror Moreh weaves together a
tapestry of the efforts of many diplomats, politicians and advisors which ends
in tremendous tragedy – the missed opportunity in achieving genuine peaceful
relations between Israelis and Palestinians. According to Moreh and many of the
spokespeople in this film who were advisors on “the peace team” for so many
years, the main reason for this is the neglect of the human factor. There was
too much blustering and politicking too often and not enough
relationship-building which could have engendered the trust necessary to
conclude a comprehensive peace accord.
However,
there were some exceptions to this rule.
The most important one was the relationship that developed between Yitzhak
Rabin and Yasser Arafat during the negotiations that conclude with the Oslo
Accords in the early 1990s. After Rabin
was elected Prime Minister in 1992, he made a very conscious shift from
confrontation to negotiation in a serious attempt to resolve the conflict. One
of the key advisors to the “peace team”, Dennis Ross, recalled this vividly.
When he met with Rabin in 1992, “Rabin told me clearly that he wants to go for
a full deal with the Palestinians!” Another key advisor on the “peace team”,
Daniel Kurtzer, who later became ambassador of the USA to Israel, talked warmly
about Rabin’s visit to Washington D.C. in that year, when he met with the “peace
team” for a serious discussion about the possibilities of peace.
Some of the
advisors recalled some behind the scenes stories about Rabin and Arafat that
were very enlightening about how their relationship began and developed. For
example, Martin Indyk, who had served as American ambassador to Israel and was
Clinton’s advisor on the Middle East and therefore a key member of the “peace
team”, revealed in the film the inside story that led to the famous handshake
between Rabin and Arafat at the signing of the Declaration of Principles” (Oslo
I) on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. Rabin set forth three
conditions—that Arafat would not carry his gun, that he would not wear his
military-looking uniform and that there would be no kissing! Indyk also
remembered how he coached President Clinton in advance to orchestrate the
handshake! In the end, it worked out for the best. Even though Rabin was
uncomfortable about the handshake, he did it! And Arafat was beaming on that occasion.
Later on, in
September 1995, at the signing ceremony of the Oslo II Accords in Washington
DC, which gave 40% of the West Bank to the Palestinians, which they believed
would be the core of their future state, Dennis Ross remembers that the
relationship between Rabin and Arafat had grown and developed and was much
stronger. They had clearly moved from being adversaries to being partners in
peace. On that occasion, Ross recalled
that Arafat actually gave a very positive speech and Rabin responded that
Palestinians need a state, so Israelis can separate from them out of respect,
not out of hatred.
After the
assassination of Rabin (November 4, 1995), it became clear that the peace
process was severely hindered. But it did limp on for many years. When Netanyahu was elected in 1996, we saw that
he did not treat Arafat with dignity the way Rabin had, and this led to the
breakdown in negotiations after the Wye River summit in 1998.
Similarly,
the very pompous and problematic personality of Ehud Barak comes off very
poorly in this film. After he is elected in 1999 on a peace platform, he was
very insistent that President Clinton host a summit because he believed that it
was the only way that another peace agreement could be achieved. The American
advisors on the “peace team” were very skeptical, but eventually they went
along with it. It turned out to be a huge failure, mostly due to the “human
factor’. Barak did not treat Arafat as a human being. Rather, he constantly
humiliated him. President Clinton kept trying to re-inject the human factor into
the negotiations through his powerful and persuasive personality, but it was
not enough.
Near the end
of this film there is a beautiful collage of photos of demonstrations,
violence, and peace negotiations for a few minutes without words. It made me think
of how many people and how much time was invested in “the peace process” to no
avail. Too often the human dimensions of the conflict –the suffering and
despair on both sides—were ignored by the politicians and the diplomats who
were too busy playing with pieces of paper (there is a great photo of Barak’s
room at Camp David II, strewn with yellow pads and pieces of paper all over the
place).
In the end,
several of the members of the “peace team” ---who devoted many years of passion
and commitment to trying to bring peace to Israel and the Palestinians—were
soberly reflective about the whole process. Marin Indyk called it “a history of
missed opportunities”. Aaron David Miller felt that “peace” was the wrong word
for what they did since it raised too many expectations. On the other hand,
Dennis Ross was insistent that “the whole Middle East might have been different
if we had made peace”. And Jamal Hallal, another advisor on the peace team,
felt that all of their attempts at peace accords did not stop people on both
sides from demonizing the people on the other side. After all these years, there
is still no real acceptance of the humanity of the people on the other side.
Instead, we see each other as enemies.
As someone
who has been involved in peacebuilding efforts between Israelis and
Palestinians for many years, I found this film to be depressing and somewhat
disappointing. By focusing only on politicians and diplomats—who specialize in
formal negotiations rather than dialogue—it underscored the limits of politics
and “Track One” diplomacy. From this point of view, I was sorry that the
filmmaker totally skipped over the 10 months of informal discussions as part of
“Track Two diplomacy” during 1993 in Norway, which led to the successful
Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, that was based on hundreds of
hours of genuine relationship-building and the creation of mutual trust.
Finally, I
think that this film should send a message to the politicians and diplomats who
may try again one day (perhaps with the help of President-elect Biden’s new
team) to restart the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. Don’t
forget the human factor this time! Remember that we are dealing with human
beings on both sides, not just pawns in a puzzle. Keep in mind that it is
important to relate to the other in these negotiations with dignity and
respect. This is a message worth remembering.